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Deceptive Advertising and the Fed-

eral Trade Commission: A Perspective
I.

INTRODUCTION

As consumer advocates become increasingly aware of the assorted dangers and promotional schemes associated with products on the market, a higher degree of consciousness is awakened
in both the purchasing public and the legislature. The function of
the latter is to protect the public from design defects in the prod-

uct and deceptions which are defrauding consumers and to assure
businessmen that such practices will not unduly hinder their
market. Accordingly, consumerism has recently become a popular cause which is necessary to assure protection for those who
have neither the time nor the facilities to adequately protect
themselves.

The primary function of advertising in the American economic
system, besides stimulation of demand for products and services,
is providing information for consumer decisionmaking. Recently,
the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,1 held that commercial
speech, which includes advertising, is to be afforded first amendment protection. 2 However, the Court, in dicta, stated that in contrast to political speech, commercial speech, if misleading or
deceptive, loses its first amendment protection. 3 Thus, when an
advertisment contains such information it does not, of course, discharge its responsibility of informing the public. Primafacie evidence for the existence of this breach of responsibility is provided
by the development of massive amounts of regulation by the Federal Trade Commission in the past few decades.
The need to avoid deception in advertising is imperative, for its
results in a misallocation of resources in economic terms, and disappointed or even injured consumers in more personal terms.
1. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2. Id. at 762. See also notes 174-91 infra and accompanying text.
3. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The elevation of commercial speech to first amendment status suggests that the courts must scrutinize Federal Trade Commission
regulation of advertising more strictly now to prevent unnecessary interference
with constitutionally protected speech.

Mindful of the dangers inherent in deceptive advertising, the
American Association of Advertising Agencies promulgated a
4
code of ethics for advertisers.
Whereas the need to avoid deception seems rather clear,5 what
constitutes deception is not so clear. For example, when
Anheuser-Busch claims that its product "Michelob Light" has
"Superior taste in a light beer" some (particularly other brewers
of low calorie beer) could argue that another beer is superior. Is
deception involved? What is meant by "Superior taste?" Another
example shows an advertisement claiming that hair dye will color
hair "permanently." If someone exposed to the advertisement believed that the dye would also color hair not yet grown (i.e., that a
single dye would last for decades) is the claim deceptive? How
many people need to misunderstand an advertisment before deception can be said to be involved?
This comment will analyze the concept of deception, and consider who must be deceived and how meaning of an advertisement is discerned. Next, it will examine the remedies, both
existing and proposed, for deceptive advertising. Finally, it will
examine the reformulation of the commercial speech doctrine
4. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ADVERTISING AGENCIES, CREATIVE CODE

(1962)

reprinted in R. STANSFIELD, ADVERTISING MANAGER'S HANDBOOK 50-51 (2d ed.
1977). The Code provides that the members:
[I]n addition to supporting and obeying the laws and legal regulations
pertaining to advertising undertake to extend and broaden the application
of high ethical standards. Specifically, we will not knowingly produce advertising which contains:
(a) False or misleading statements or exaggerations, visual or verbal.
(b) Testimonials which do not reflect the real choice of a competent witness.
(c) Price claims which are misleading.
(d) Comparisons which unfairly disparage a competitive product or service.
(e) Claims insufficiently supported, or which distort the true meaning or
practicable application of statements made by professional or scientific authority.
(f) Statements, suggestions or pictures offensive to public decency.
Id. at 51.
The code goes on to say that these are areas which are subject to honestly differing interpretation and that taste is subjective and may vary from time to time, as
well as from individual to individual. It says finally that "we agree not to recommend to an advertiser and to discourage the use of advertising which is in poor or
questionable taste or which is deliberately irritating through content, presentation
or excessive repetition." Id.
5. The issue of consumer deception has two major thrusts. The most basic is
that advertising deceives consumers by causing them to want products that are
not good for them or yield less satisfaction for themselves or society than other
types of products. This serious issue was analyzed in a research framework in
Howard & Tinkham, A Framework for Understanding Social Criticism of
Advertising, 35 J. MKTG 2-7 (Oct. 1971). A more objective issue, and the subject of
this comment, is whether or not consumers are fraudulently persuaded by advertising activities.
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under the first amendment. First, however, it will be necessary to
trace the historical development of the Federal Trade Commission's regulation of advertising in order to provide a conceptual
perspective for evaluating deceptive advertising.
II.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION's REGULATION OF
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING

As sophistication of promotional techniques increased, and with
it the scope of problems presented by false and deceptive advertising, the inadequacy of existing common law and statutory law
to deal with these problems became manifest. 6 With the development of major multi-state marketing areas, the desirability of uniform standards suggested the possibility of federal regulation
designed to fulfill the need for comprehensive and effective regulation.
A.

The Federal Trade Commission Act

The Federal Trade Commission 7 was constituted in 1914,8 and
from its inception has been the federal agency primarily concerned with the regulation of advertising. 9 Although this function
6. At common law, false and deceptive advertising was subject to legal controls through three types of remedies. The first remedy consisted of civil actions
by consumers. See generally Handler, False and MisleadingAdvertising, 39 YALE
LJ. 22, 23-28 (1929). (hereinafter cited as Handler); Bohlen, Misrepresentationsas

Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REV. 733, 733-34, 746-47 (1929). A second remedy was available in the form of civil actions by competitors. See
generally Handler, supra at 34-42; Comment, Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 905-08 (1964). Third, criminal sanctions were available. See generally Handler, supra, at 28-34; Comment, Untrue Advertising, 36
YALE L.J. 1155, 1156-57 (1927). Although the courts were quick to condemn misleading conduct in dicta (see American Washboard Co. v. Saginow Mfg. Co., 103 F.
281, 285 (6th Cir. 1900) (equitable relief was denied, however, the court,.in dicta,
referred to the false claims as "morally wrong and improper")), judicially imposed
limitations and practical considerations of time and cost confirmed these remedies
to narrow circumstances. See generally Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the
Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 550 (1964).
The "hands-off' attitude exhibited toward trade practices of doubtful probity was
rooted in the history of markets and fairs in medieval England, in which trust was
neither given nor expected, and was reflected in the maxim caveat emptor. Id.
7. Hereinafter cited as "Commission."
8. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 203, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (Current version at 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (Supp. V 1975)).
9. Works on the Commission and its regulation of advertising are legion. For
some more prominent works on the Commission see generally E. Cox, R.
FELLMETH,

(1969); F.

& T.

SHULTZ, 'THE NADER REPORT' ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

(1924); Posner, The Fed-

has been a major party of the Commission's activity from the first
complaint it filed, its juridiction over advertising was not the product of an explicit legislative grant of power. Indeed, it was apparently never mentioned in the extensive congressional debates
preceding the Act creating the Commission but was assumed by
the Commission as part of its control over "unfair methods of
competition in commerce."1 0
The Act was intended to be an instrument against restraint of
trade." Nevertheless, the Commission commenced forthwith to
regulate advertising.' 2 The courts, basically, approved this activity. 1 3

However, an early challenge to the Commission's regulatory at-

tempts resulted in significant limitations upon the Commission's
eral Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969); Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Trade Commission, 64 COLuM. L. REV. 385 (1964). For
excellent discussions of the Commission's regulation of advertising, see
Symposium, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Deceptive Advertising, 17
, 26 FoOD
U. KAN. L. REV. 551 (1969); Jones, To Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth.
DRUG COSM. L.J. 173 (1971); Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of
Advertising, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Kintner); Millstein,
The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439
(1964) (hereinafter cited as Millstein); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977) (hereinafter
cited as Pitofsky). Specifically on the subject of corrective advertising and injunctive relief; see generally Cornfield, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective
Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REV. 623 (1976); Note,
The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drug, 75
MICH. L. REV. 745 (1976).
10. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, by 15
U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975); see Millstein, supra note 9, at 439. WhenCongress enacted Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act it intentionally refused to
catalogue the prohibited unfair trade practices because of possible omissions and
the development of other unfair trade practices by businessmen in the future. The
House Conference Report emphasized that: "[E ]ven if all known unfair practices
were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin all
over again. If Congress were to adopt this method of definition, it would be undertaking an endless task. H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914). Therefore, general statutory language was adopted, and the Commission was assigned
the task of filling in the details through its enforcement and regulatory procedures.
See generally Rublee, The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade
Commission's Regulation of Advertising, 11 ACAD. POL. ScI. PROC. 666 (1929). See
also supra note 9, and accompanying text.
11. In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922), the Court stated
that "the case before [it] was begun under the Federal Trade Commission Act
which was intended to supplement previous antitrust legislation."
12. FTC v. Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13 (1916); FTC v. Abbott & Co., 1 F.T.C. 16
(1916). See also Kintner, supra note 9, and accompanying text.
13. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922); Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919). As Professor Kintner, supra note 9, expressed it:
[W hile only forty-three Commission orders out of eighty-two reviewed on
their merits by the courts up until 1931, were either entirely or substantially upheld, twenty-two FTC orders concerning false advertising reviewed by the courts in the same period were upheld.
Kintner, supra note 9, at 1274-75.
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power over advertising. In FTC v. Gratz,14 the United States
Supreme Court declared that Section 5 encompassed only unfair
competitive practices condemned at common law.' 5 It was not
until 1932 that the Commission's attempts to regulate advertising
practices were afforded support by the Supreme Court. In FTC v.
Winsted Hosiery Co.,16 the Court held that labeling goods containing less then ten percent wool as "woolen" was deceptive and that
the Commission's power to regulate unfair trade practices included the right to control advertising.
Though Winsted seemingly cleared the way for the Commission's regulation of advertising practices,' 7 it soon became clear
the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Commission's efforts
was less than complete. In FTC v. Klesner,18 the Court ruled that
the Commission lacked jurisdiction unless the harm to the public
interest caused by unfair practice was "specific and substantial."19 Additionally, in 1931, the Court handed down a potentially
catastrophic decision in FTC v. Raladam,20 holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act was only a supplement to the Sherman and Clayton Acts and that the Commission could not issue
orders prohibiting false advertising absent proof of injury to com14. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
15. The Court explained that:
The words "unfair methods of competition" are not defined by statute and
their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission,
ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they include. They are
clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to
good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.
Id. at 427.
16. 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
17. Despite adverse rulings, the Commission continued to rule that false advertising tendin-g--to injure competitors and to deceive consumers was an unfair
competition method within the meaning of the Act. See Royal Baking Power Co.
v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). See also FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928),
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928), upholding the Commission's determination that
public deception is unfair and could be prohibited by the Commission. Also, in
the period prior to 1931, twenty-two of twenty-nine of the Commission's cease and
desist orders involving false advertising were sustained. See Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False Advertising, 31 COLUm. L.
REV. 527, 539 (1931).
18. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
19. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. Adopted in FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 .U.S. at 453. See McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive
Methods, 21 IOWA L. REV. 274, 284 (1936).
20. 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930), affid, 283 U.S. 643 (1931).

2
petitors, regardless of public deception. 1
Thus, the Commission was not favored by the courts from the
outset. During the first four years of its existence it was reversed
Court and in forty-six
in twelve of sixteen cases by the Supreme
22
of seventy-seven circuit court cases.

B. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment
In 1938, Congress finally came to the Commission's rescue. It
legislatively overruled Raladam by enacting the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment. 23 The Commission was given authority over unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, thus extending the
Act's coverage to consumers as well as competitiors. 24 The
amendment made it clear that a deceptive act or practice was illegal in and of itself, even if it did not amount to an unfair competition method. The amended Act also made it unlawful to
disseminate any false advertisement "for the purpose of inducing,
or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase of
food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics . . ." and any such dissemina-

tion is made an unfair or deceptive practice in commerce within
the meaning of Section 5.25
The 1938 provisions also expanded the means by which the
Commission could combat advertising dangerous to health, sup21. 283 U.S. at 647, 654.
22. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 40 (1962); Note, The Federal
Trade Commission and Reform of the Administrative Process, 62 CoLuM. L. REV.
671, 679 (1962).
23. Federal Trade Commission Act § 1, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (Supp. V 1975). Section 5 of the Act originally provided: "Unfair
methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." The
Wheeler-Lea Amendment amended Section 5 to provide: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts of practices in commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful." (Emphasis added.) It is now settled that no competitive injury is necessary for the Commission to take action against a deceptive advertiser. Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See Millstein,
supra note 9, at 453-54. In 1975, Congress added the language "affecting commerce" to the jurisdiction basis of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (Supp. V 1975),
amending, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1973).
24. The Senate Report indicated the feelings of the Commission: "[T] he Commission should have the power to restrain an unfair act before it has become a
method or practice, if in its discretion such restraint is in the public interest." S.
REP. No. 163, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See also 83 CONG. REc. 391-92 (1938)
(remarks of Congressman Lea):
One thing we propose in the pending bill [Wheeler-Lea Amendment] ...
is that it is sufficient to establish the unfair practice without showing inIndeed, the principle of the act is carried further
jury to a competitor ...
to protect the consumer as well as the competitor ... and afford a protection to the consumers of the country that they have not heretofore enjoyed.
25. Federal Trade Commission Act § 12, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), as amended by 15
U.S.C. § 52(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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26
plementing its existing power to issue cease and desist orders.
The Commission was granted two new sanctions, although restricted to cases involving foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics, i.e.,
the right to sue in federal district courts for injunctions, 27 and the
right to impose criminal penalties in the event of damage to
28
health.
Neither of these sanctions have been widely used. The reasons
are fairly obvious: the authority to sue for temporary injunctions
in cases involving foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, while it
did not expressly dispense with the time honored prerequisite of
irreparable injury, seemed to replace it with the twin requirements of "reason to believe" that an advertisement would run
29
afoul of the statute, and contravention of the public's interest.

26. The basic mandate of the Commission is to "prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (Supp. V 1975). The
Commission's principal means of enforcing its mandate is the administrative procedure leading to a cease and desist order. The mechanics of the hearing procedure may be found in 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.41-.46 (1978). In general, however, a hearing is
in the form of a trial, and the parties "have the right of due notice, cross-examination, presentation of evidence, objection, motion, argument, and all other rights essential to a fair hearing." 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(c) (1978). Under the Act, a cease and
desist order becomes final:
(1) Upon expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if
such petition has been duly filed within such time,. . . or
(2) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari,.

. . or

or
Upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, ..
Upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance of the
mandate of the Supreme Court, if such Court directs that the order
15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (Supp. III
of the Commission be affirmed ....
1973).
A Respondent who violates a final cease and desist order becomes liable for the
civil penalties provided in section 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
27. The Commission is authorized to petition in a federal district court for an
injunction whenever it has "reason to believe":
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is engaged in, or is about
to engage in, the dissemination or causing the dissemination of any advertisement [in violation of § 121 and ...
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending and issuance of a complaint by
the Commission . . . and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or the order of the Commiswould be to
sion to cease and desist made thereon has become final ....
the interest of the public ....
The statute then directs that "[ulpon proper showing a temporary injunction or
restraining order shall be granted without bond." Federal Trade Commission Act
§ 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (Supp. 1II 1973).
28. Federal Trade Commission Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 54(a) (1970).
29. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
(3)
(4)

In order to make this double showing, the Commission would
have to have sufficiently progressed in the investigation to be able
to show the existence of a probable deception. 30 Considering the
time lapse until such action could reasonably be brought, it would
still be likely that the advertising campaign in question would
have been concluded. 3 1 A more telling reason for not using this
remedy is the uncontrovertible fact that the Commission would
lose a good part of its primary jurisdiction of finding the facts and
have them left undisturbed by the courts by moving for the injunctive remedy. The right and duty to find that there exists "reason to believe" that an advertisment has a tendency to deceive
would devolve upon the court. Thereby, findings made by a court
would tend to become binding upon the Commission. Furthermore, the statute leaves open the question of what is to happen
after issuance of a preliminary injunction. It seems evident that
Congress thought final action on the merits by the Commission
would ensure before hearings on making the injunction final
would have to be held. Nevertheless, a few suits for temporary injunction have been brought.32 However, the criminal sanction has
remained virginal, despite the fact that it has been available for
more than forty years.
By a rider to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act,33 the
Federal Trade Commission Act was amended so as to enlarge and
extend the power of the Commission to obtain injunctive relief
against deceptive and unfair competitive practices. Thereby, the
existing authority concerning foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics
30. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327, affd, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
But see FrC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951).
31. Illustrative of the potential for delay is FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co.,
supra, note 30, in which a complaint was issued in August, 1949, yet a cease and
desist order was not entered until October, 1952. That order was subsequently
challenged in the Seventh Circuit and thus became "final" only after affirmance by
the court in November, 1953. See Rhodes Pharmacal Co., v. FrC, 208 F.2d 382 (7th
Cir. 1953), modified, 348 U.S. 940 (1955). See also FrC v. Thomsen-King & Co., 109
F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1940); FTC v. Nat'l Health Aides, 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
32. Note 31 supra. Injunctive relief was granted in at least two cases: Travel
King, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20, 502 (FTC
1974) (promotional practices of a "psychic surgery" tour to the Philippines); FTC
v. British Oxygen Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $
75,003-04 (FTC 1974) (an acquisition). The Commission has declined to set down
any guidelines for the use of its injunctive power, 646 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP
(BNA) A-6 (Jan. 15, 1974), but Thomas Posch, former Director of the Commission's
Bureau of Consumer Protection, stated in an interview that the injunctive powers
will not be used in any "novel" cases (as reported in 645 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) AA-1 (Jan. 8,1974)).
33. The amendment to Section 13 was adopted as Section 408(f) of the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975). See
Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's Injunctive Powers Under the Alaska
PipelineAmendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 872 (1975) (hereinafter cited
as Halverson).
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was extended so as to encompass all subject matters under its jurisdiction. There are now three prerequisites for issuance of a
preliminary injunction: (1) the Commission must have reason to
believe that there has occurred, or is about to occur, a violation of
the Act, (2) the issuance of an injunction must be in the public
interest, and (3) the Commission must be likely to ultimately succeed against the alleged violations. 34 Indications are that the
Commission will make more vigorous use of this injunctive remedy than has been its inclination in the past.35 The question of

whether or not the courts will relax their requirements in view of
certain indications in the legislative history of the proviso 36 remains to be determined, particularly in view of the traditional emphasis on judicial discretion in the promulgation of injunction,
especially against prospective speech.
After the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, the question was no longer
"What is the Commission's jurisdictional authority to regulate
34. See text at notes 27 supra, and 36 infra.
35. See generally Note, The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, 75 MICH. L. REV. 745 (1977). See also note 33 supra.
36. H.R. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in 11973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 2523, 2533 states:
Section 408(f) relates to the standard of proof to be met by the Federal
Trade Commission for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction. It is not intended in any way to impose a totally
new standard of proof different from that which is now required of the
Commission. The intent is to maintain the statutory or "public interest"
standard which is now applicable and not to impose the traditional "equity" standard of irreparable damage, probability of success on the merits,
and that the balance of equities favors the petitioner. This latter standard
derives from the common law and is appropriate for litigation between
private parties. It is not, however, appropriate for the implementation of a
Federal Statute by an independent regulatory agency where the standards
of public interest measure the propriety of the public interest and need
for injunctive relief.
The inclusion of the new language is to define the duty of the courts to
exercise independent judgment on the propriety of issuance of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. This new language is
intended to codify the decisional law of the Federal Trade Commission v.
National Health Aides, 108 F. Supp. 340, and the Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, and similar cases which have defined the judicial role to include the exercise of such independent
judgment. The Conferees did not intend, nor do they consider it appropriate, to burden the Commission with the requirements imposed by the
traditional equity standard which the common law applies to private litigants.
Compare FTC v. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976), with FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708
(9th Cir. 1976). See Halverson supra note 33, at 880-81 n.26. See generally note 35
supra, and accompanying text.

false advertising?" but, instead, became "What are the appropriate standards and techniques to be applied in determining
whether advertisements are deceptive?" Emphasis focused upon
protecting consumers from injury and an advertisement's effect
upon the consuming public became more important than advertis37
ing methods or devices.

III.

DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING

Conceptually, deception is found when an advertisement is the
input into the perceptual process of some audience and the output of the perceptual process (a) differs from the reality of the situation and (b) affects buying behavior to the detriment of the
consumer. 38 The input itself may be determined to contain falsehoods. The more difficult and perhaps more common case, however, is when the input (the advertisement) is not obviously false,
but the perceptual process generates an impression that it is deceptive. A disclaimer may not pass through the attention filter, or
39
the message may be misinterpreted.
However, it is not necessary to show actual deception. Just as
a requirement of actual confusion in passing off cases has been
replaced in most jurisdictions by requiring only a likelihood to
confuse, the tendency or capacity to deceive rather than actual
37. The court in Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941) stated
that: "[T]he effect of the amendment was to broaden the Commission's jurisdiction as to enable it to act where only the public interest was adversely affected by
the unfair practices." Id. at 643-44.
38. See generally E.S. MAYNES, DECISION MAKING FOR CONSUMERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSUMER ECONOMICS 113-16 (1976). Professor Maynes advocates the
following definition for deceptive advertising.
An advertisement (or advertising campaign) is deceptive when both:
1. The advertisement leaves the consumer with an impression(s) and/or
belief(s) different from what normally would be expected if the consumer
had reasonable knowledge; and
2. The advertisement leaves the consumer with an impression(s) and/or
belief(s) that is factually untrue or potentially misleading.
Id. at 117.
For an excellent analysis of the consumer decisionmaking process see ENGEL,
KOLLAT & BLACKWELL, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 44-66 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited
as CONSUMER BEHAVIOR). The authors present a conceptual model which delineates the psychological variables which are of greatest significance in understanding consumer motivation and behavior (stored information, evaluative criteria,
attitude toward alternatives, personality), the perceptual process (stimulus inputs
into a filter, attention, comprehension, and retention), the decision process (problem recognition, internal search, external search, purchase, and outcomes), and
the influence of external constraining forces (norms, family income, and so on).
For an in-depth study and review of all major buying studies of the past few de-

cades

see LESSIG, PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSUMER BUYING BEHAVIOR:

A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 5-14 (1971).
39. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 38, at 210-11. See generally Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legislative and Judicial
Reform, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 625, 626-32 (1969).
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deception has become the testing stone under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.40
A.

Who Is Deceived?

The Commission has determined that essentially all persons
are to be protected, in particular those who are naive, trusting,
and of low intelligence, small though the numbers may be. 41 In
FTC v. Standard Education Society,42 for example, encyclopedia
purchasers were solicited by salesmen representing that the
volumes were being given away free as an advertising plan. The
customers only had to purchase a loose leaf extension service at a
price of $69.50. In actuality, the $69.50 was the retail price of both
the encyclopedia and the loose leaf service. The court held that:
The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are
trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its
power to deceive others less experienced. There is no duty resting upon a
citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business.
Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best
element of business has long since decided that honesty could govern
caveat emptor should not be
competitive enterprises, and that the rule of
43
relied upon to reward fraud and deception.
40. E.g., Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1975) (false and deceptive
advertising of steel siding); Spiegel v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974) (use of "free trial" and "percent off" in advertising had

capacity to deceive); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) (fictitious
"manufacturer's suggested retail prices" had capacity to deceive); Goodman v.
FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 595 (9th Cir. 1957) (fictitious "guild" designation had capacity to
deceive); Deer v. FTC, 152 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 1945) (use of "manufacturing" in
trade name had capacity to deceive); FTC v. Raladam, 316 U.S. 149, 151 (1942) (progenitor case for capacity to deceive requirement). See also Note, The Regulation
of Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1025-27 (1956).

41. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 917 (1962). For example, Judge Augustus Hand's often quoted remark
that the Commission may, if it "thinks ...

best ...

insist upon a form of advertis-

ing clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein,'" General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941), should be read in the context of his
observation that "[w] hile we do not regard the plan used here as inevitably mis" Id. at 35. See also
leading, we thing that in a good many cases it would be ..
Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819
(1960); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944);
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
42. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
43. Id. at 116. See also Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 1960) (representations about efficacy of bedwetting "cure" made to "laity," who may be incapable
of understanding their misleading character); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175,
182 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941) (noting that the average individual is unlikely to analyze carefully complicated deferred credit plans).

This same notion was later articulated in Aronberg v. FTC,44 as
follows:
The law is not made for experts but to protect the public-the vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who,
but too often are governed by
in making purchases, do not stop to analyze
45
appearance and general impressions.

In Gelb v. FTC,46 the low intelligence level considered by the
courts reached an extreme. The Commission had prohibited the
claim that an hair coloring product could color hair permanently,
such that even new hair would have the desired new color. The
evidence consisted of the testimony of a single woman who indicated that although she would not be so naive, some may indeed
be misled by the use of the word "permanent."
However, in 1963, the Commission rendered two decisions providing some relief to the charge that no deception can exist. In
Heinz W Kirchner,4 7 involving an inflatable swimming aid advertisement and the claim that when the device designated "SwimEzy" was worn under a swimming suit it was "thin and invisible."
The Commission, who decided that it would be unlikely that a
purchaser would take this claim literally, enunciated:
[T]o be sure, "Swim-Ezy" is not invisible or impalpable or dimensionless,
and to anyone who so understood the representation, it would be false. It
is not likely, however, that many prospective purchasers would take the
representation thus in its literal sense. True, as has been reiterated many
times, the Commission's responsibility is to prevent deception of the gullible and credulous, as well as the cautious and knowledgeable . . . This
principle loses its validity, however, if it is applied uncritically or pushed
to an absurd extreme. An advertiser cannot be charged with liability with
respect of every conceivable misconception, however outlandish, to which
his representations might be subject among the foolish or feebleminded.
Some people, because of ignorance or incomprehension, may be misled by
even a scrupulously honest claim. Perhaps a few misguided souls believe,
for example, that all "Danish pastry" is made in Denmark. Is it, therefore,
an actual deception to advertise "Danish pastry" when it is made in this
country? Of course not. A representation does not become "false and deceptive" merely because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an inof the class of persons to whom
significant and unrepresentative 4 segment
8
the representation is addressed.

The Commission again reiterated this stance regarding nonprotection of the foolish and feebleminded in FTC v. Papercraft
44. 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
45. Id. at 167. See also Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 64 F.T.C. 1018, 1032 (1964),
affd, 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384, U.S. 939 (1966) (violation found
where evidence showed fourteen percent of the audience was deceived). See
generally FTC v. R.F. Keppell & Bros. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
46. 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944). Other cases reaching similarly farfetched conclusions are collected in Millstein, supra note 9, at 458-62.
47. 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), alfd sub nom. Kirchner v. FTC, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1964); cf. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 676 (2d Cir. 1963) (no violation if
the "ordinary" reader, to be misled, must have "not only a careless and imperceptive mind but also a propensity for unbounded flights of fancy").
48. 63 F.T.C. at 1289-90.
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Corp.49
In Kirchner, the Commission also indicated that advertising
aimed at particularly susceptible groups will be evaluated with respect to the intelligence level of that group.5 0 Thus, when children are the target, deception will be evaluated with respect to
them. 5 1 This refinement is interesting because it recognizes that
people may perceive stimuli differently, depending on the situational context. Hopefully, the Commission and the judiciary will
continue to become more refined in their perceptions of those
52
who are to be protected.
Despite Kirchner, it is still true that deception is defined with
respect to relatively small audience segments with above average
tendencies to be deceived. 53 Such a posture, when pushed to an
49. 63 F.T.C. 1965, 1993 (1963). However, in ITT Continental Baking Co., [197020,464 (FTC 1973), the Commis1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
sion reviewing a Wonder Bread advertisement, noted that although "most people
above the age of six might view the literal message of the 'fantasy growth se-

quence' with skepticism," this would not prevent a finding that the advertisement
had a potential for deceiving others. See also Eastern Dectective Acad., Inc.,
19,727 (FTC 1971) (reaffir[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
mation that the law protects the credulous as well as the wary).
50. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941) (prospective automobile purchasers).
51. See FTC v. Stupell Originals, Inc., 67 F.T.C. 173 (1965) (children). See
generally Thain, Consumer Protection. Advertising-The FTC Response, 26 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 609, 615 (1971). With regards to limitations on advertising, it is
interesting to note that the Canadian Broadcasting Company decided to eliminate
advertising on children's programs in 1974. 662 ANrrrRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-23 (May 7, 1974). In the United States, the Commission recently rejected proposed guides against advertising of children's premiums on television. 4 TRADE
39,043 (FTC 1977). However, there have been some recent recREG. REP. (CCH)
ommendations by the Commission in a staff report on television advertising to
38,046 (FTC 1978). See also
children generally. 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
generally NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ADVERTISING ON CHILDREN (1977) (provocative and informative discussion of
advertising directed at children); Note, The Needfor a Seller's FiduciaryDuty toward Children,4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 249 (1977) (among the most basic concepts
in American jurisprudence is that children are to be afforded special protection.
Consonant with this tradition, advertisers are imposed with a "fiduciary duty"
when they address children).
Where special audiences are not involved, the low level at which the intelligence
standard is set has elicited criticism on grounds that it is wasteful and makes the
Commission "look fairly foolish in this business of protecting fools," Alexander,
FederalRegulation of FalseAdvertising, 17 U. KAN. L.REV. 573 (1969), and on constitutional grounds because an intelligence level set this low denies the advertiser
freedom of speech, Millstein, supra note 9, at 492.
52. Cf.F.T.C. v. Coca Cola, 83 F.T.C. 746 (1973) (an opinion that might prove to
be pivotal in regard to the standard of perception utilized).
53. See generally, Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC

extreme, as it was in Gelb,54 can mean that there is no defense
against a Commission charge of deception. A small segment of

the population can always be identified who will misinterpret the
clearest communication. Thus, a demand that the law protect
all--even the trusting and the unthinking-is indeed an extreme
position.
B.

The Meaning of the Advertisement-What is the Promise?

In reviewing the Commission's determinations of the meaning
of advertisements, the courts appear at times to have narrowed
the usual standards of judicial review and declared the meaning
of. the advertisement to be a question of fact determined by the
Commission 55 or peculiarly within "the Commission's special expertise and responsibility in the premises." 56 This judicial approach to meaning, together with the court's acquiescence in the
use of a low intelligence level, has left wide discretion in the
hands of the Commission to ascertain the meaning of an advertiser's promise.
A few significant ground rules, however, which have been formulated by the Commission for use in advertising cases, deserve
consideration. These rules, while not always automatically applied, and sometimes ignored in favor of other maxims, appear
frequently enough in the cases to provide a guide to the Commis57
sion's approach to meaning.
Approach, 1 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 349, 381-84 (1973); Moewe, Consumer Class Actions and Costs. An Economic Perspectiveon Deceptive Advertising, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 592, 605 (1971); MacIntyre & Von Brand, Unfair Methods of Competition as an
Evolving Concept-Preludeto Consumerism, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 597, 613 (1970).
54. See note 46 supra, and accompanying text.
55. In FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965), a case concerning the
question whether a "two-for-the-price-of-one" offer was deceptive, the Court
speaking through Justice Brennan, stated that: "[It is not for courts to say
whether this violates the Act! .... The Commission is often in a better position
than are courts to determine when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of
the Act." Id. at 48-49. But in 1968, Justice Black stated in FTC v. Texaco, Inc. 393
U.S. 223 (1968), that: "While the ultimate responsibility for the construction of the
(Act] rests with the courts, we have held on many occasions that the determinations of the Commission, an expert body charged with the practical application of
the [Act], are entitled to great weight." Id. at 226. More recently, however, in FTC
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 223, 249 (1972), the Court acknowledged that
the determination that an unfair practice had been engaged in, is a conclusion,
without however, explaining whether it is a conclusion of fact or one of law, although it seems that the latter was meant.
56. Note 55 supra. See also Savitch v. FTC, 218 F.2d 817, 818 (2d Cir. 1955).
57. See Millstein, supra note 9, at 492-93.
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1. The Entire Advertisement
58
The advertisement will be judged by its general impression. It
may be that all claims made within an advertisement are literally
true yet the total impression of the advertisement may still be deceptive.5 9 Thus, in the leading case of P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC.,60
the court ruled that Lorrillard had developed deceptive advertisements despite the fact that their claims were literally true.
Reader's Digest had run an article which indicated that all cigarettes were harmful and that the differences between them were
minimal. To illustrate the point, a list of cigarettes was included
with the tar and nicotine content on each noted. A Lorillard
brand happened to have the lowest level of tar and nicotine although by an insignificant margin. The Lorillard campaign emphasizing the Reader's Digest article was therefore deemed to be
61
deceptive.
In another example, 62 a television commercial for a car wax
used flaming gasoline on an automobile to demonstrate that the
wax could withstand intense heat. However, the gasoline was
only burning for a few seconds. It was extinguished before any
significant heat was generated. Consequently, the advertisement
was determined to be deceptive in that the claim was not actually
substantiated by the test.

2.

The Ambiguous Statement

If an advertisement may be interpreted in two ways and one of
them would be deceptive, the advertisement is regarded as deceptive.63 The use of the phrase "government-supported" for exam58. See, e.g., Sebrane Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1943); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 55 F.T.C. 354, 370 (1958).
59. See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1967) (advertisement implies that most tiredness results from iron deficiency anemia); Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Six Month" floor wax
trade name implies that wax lasts six months); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC,
304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962) (advertisement implies that shoes have therapeutic
value). See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 58 F.T.C. 422, 428 (1961); Kalwajts v.
FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956); Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1953).
60. 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
61. The Lorillard court stated that "[one] who deceives by resorting to such
method cannot excuse the deception by relying upon the truthfulness of the partial truth by which it has been accomplished." Id. at 58.
62. FTC v. Hutchinson Chemical Corp. 55 F.T.C. 1942 (1959).
63. Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376
U.S. 967 (1964); United States v. 95 Barrels, etc., of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924); Potato Chip Inst. v. General Mills, Inc., 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).

ple, could be interpreted as "government approved" and such use
has been challenged. 64 In another case, the Commission held that
a toothpaste's claim that it provided "complete" protection was
65
deceptive.
When a claim is extremely vague, alternative interpretations
are not always obvious. An advertiser will claim, for example,
that its product tones up muscles, or provides a lifetime guarantee, or is for the treatment of a disease. What do these terms really mean? It may be noted that to an advertising researcher the
quantification of the number of interpretations and the extent to
which each would emerge would not be an unusually difficult or
costly research task. However, the Commission and the courts
tend not to rely upon such techniques.66
3.

Misleading Silence

The Commission can require that a more complete disclosure
be made to correct a misconception. Thus, in J. B. Williams Co. v.
FTC,67 the manufacturer of Geritol was required to indicate that
its product was of no benefit to the great majority of people suffering from that "rundown feeling." The advertisement in question
had represented that Geritol, because of its iron content, was an
effective cure for people "tired and run-down" 68 when, in fact, iron
deficiency was responsible for this condition in only a small percentage of people. The court upheld the Commission's authority
to require future Geritol advertisements to disclose that:
[ijn the great majority of persons who experience such symptoms, these
symptoms are not caused by a deficiency of one or more of the vitamins
contained in the preparation [Geritol] or by iron deficiency or iron deficiency
anemia; and for such persons the preparation will be of no benefit. 6 9

Similarly, baldness cures have been required to indicate that
70
baldness usually is hereditary and therefore untreatable.
It is interesting to consider how far pressure from the Commis64. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 317
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
65. Bristol-Myers Co., 46 F.T.C. 162 (1949), affd, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
66. See generally Gardner, Deception in Advertising: A ConceptualApproach,
39 J. MKTG. 40-46 (Jan. 1975); Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the
Federal Trade Commission, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 551, 559-72 (1969).

67. 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967). But see Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950) (misleading half-truths require a statement
of what was omitted).
68. 381 F.2d at 887.
69. Id. at 892.
70. Compare Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir.
1960), with Feil v. FrC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); American Medicinal Products,
Inc. v. FrC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1942); D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942).
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sion for complete disclosure could go. There are a wide variety of
advertised brands which differ little in substance from competitors. It is a common practice to associate a brand with an attribute of the product class. 7 ' Should the brand be required to state
in its advertisement(s) that all brands are virtually identical in
this respect? For example, an aspirin advertisement may discuss
the pain-relieving quality without noting the fact that all aspirinbased brands will have similar effect. It appears that the Com72
mission is moving in this direction.
The argument for such a policy, requiring disclosure that all
brands are similar with respect to a certain product attribute, is
primarily that advertising is a mechanism to communicate information which will be helpful to the consumer in making a
purchasing decision and that "image" advertising is not helpful.
If advertising content is not informative from this perspective and
in fact could lead to nonoptimal brand choice decisions, it should
be curtailed. However, it may be that such a rule could, at least to
some extent, reduce the product class information a consumer receives as brands lose their incentive to communicate product
class attribute information. If most advertising relates to brand
choice instead of product class choice, this possibility is perhaps a
minor consideration. A problem associated with such a proposal
is to determine if a brand does have a real differential advantage.
To a market researcher who has the benefit of perceptual maps
and sophisticated taste tests, a brand may seem significantly different. To a consumer, and perhaps the Commission, these differences may appear minor.
4.

Materiality of the Falsehood

For an advertisement to be deceptive, it must contain a material
73
It
untruth-that is, one capable of affecting purchase decisions.
public
inin
will
result
advertisement
that
the
likely
be
should
jury. One commentator explained the concept in these words:
'Public Interest' does not mean that a consumer must suffer damage, or

71. See generally CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 38, at 247-64.
72. See generally, Note, Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No Virginia,
Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH. L. REV.
374 (1971).
73. Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942); Pep
Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941). See also
Note, Developments in the Law--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1056
(1967).

that it must be shown that goods purchased are unequal to the value expended. Rather, 'public injury' results if the advertisement has a tendency to induce action (such as purchase itself) detrimental to the
consumer that might not otherwise have been taken. If such action could
not have been induced by the claim (even though false), there is no 'public injury.' This requirement comports with the express provision of Secmust be
tion 15 of the FTC Act, as amended, that the 7advertisement
4
misleading in a material respect to be actionable.

In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 75 the Court applied the materiality requirement to modify a Commission decision. 76 The case
involved the shaving of simulated sandpaper: sand on plexiglass.
The advertisement appeared to demonstrate the moisturizing
qualities of Palmolive Rapid Shave. The Commission noted that
in fact sandpaper could only be shaved after a lengthy period of
soaking and thus the advertisement was deceptive. This type of
deception was material in that consumers were likely to rely upon
the demonstration in making purchase decisions. However, the
Commission went further and noted that the use of a sand on
plexiglass mockup would have been prohibited even if Rapid
Shave could shave sandpaper as represented. 77 The court of appeals rejected the sweeping language of the complaint, arguing
that mock-ups are permissible if they do not affect purchase decisions. 78 As a result, the Commission revised its opinion to indicate that only mock-ups and props that are intended to visually
demonstrate a quality material to the selling of the product are
prohibited. 79 Thus, mashed potatoes could be used in television
commercials in scenes depicting ice cream consumption (ice
74. See Millstein, supra note 9, at 485; see also Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and The Federal Trade Commission, 28 TENN. L. REV. 493, 502 (1960). It
should be noted that another ground for the need for materiality is the fact that
the law abhors dealing with matters which are irrelevant or de minimis. See
Greyser, Advertising: Attacks and Counters, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. 22, 28 (1972).
75. 380 U.S. 374 (1965). See generally, Note, The Federal Trade Commission:
Deceptive Advertising and the Colgate-PalmoliveCompany, 12 WASHBURN L. J. 133
(1973).
76. Prior opinions include Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir.
1963); In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 62 F.T.C. 1269 (1963); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v.
FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962); In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 59 F.T.C. 1452 (1961).
77. See Note, Effective Guidance Through Cease and Desist Order. The T-V
Commercial, 38 IND. L. J. 442, 445 (1963).
78. Colgate Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962). The court of appeals felt it was the Commission's intention to prohibit all simulated props in television commercials. The court believed that "[w] here the only untruth is that the
substance [the viewer] sees on the screen is artificial, and the visual appearance
is otherwise, a correct and accurate representation of the product itself, he is not
injured." Id. at 94.
79. 62 F.T.C. 1269 (1962). The same court of appeals again found the Commission's order unsatisfactory and refused to enforce it. 326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963).
The Commission appealed and the Supreme Court held the Commission's order
was a good-faith attempt to incorporate the legal principles contained in the court
of appeal's first order. The Commission corrected the inference that mock-ups
were illegal per se. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
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cream melts rapidly under lights) if the texture and color of the
80
prop are not emphasized as selling points of the product.
5.

Subjective Claims-"Puffing"

A rather well-established rule of law is that trade "puffing" is
permissible. There are essentially two forms of puffery. The first
is a subjective statement of opinion as to a product's quality using
such terms as "best" or "greatest." Nearly all advertisements contain some measure of this type of puffery. Examples include the
following: "You can't get any closer"; "Coca-Cola is the 'Real
Thing' "; "State Farm is all you need to know about insurance";
81
None of these
"Bayer Works Wonders"; "Super Shell"; etc.
statements have been proven to be true but neither have they
been proven false. They all involve some measure of commercial
exaggeration.
The second form of puffery is gross exaggeration extended to
the point of outright fantasy which is obviously not true. Esso
does not really put a "Tiger in Your Tank"; a Green Gaint selling
vegetables is rare; and though it is possible to have little men sailing around your toilet bowl hawking "Tidi-Bowl," such sightings
82
are infrequent.
In 1946, the court set aside a Commission ruling in Carlay Co. v.
FTC,83 holding that a weight reduction plan which claimed to be
"easy" to follow was deceptive. The court commented that:
[W]hat was said was clearly justifiable ... under those cases recognizing
that such words as "easy," "perfect," "amazing," "prime," "wonderful,"
"excellent," are regarded in law as mere puffing or dealer's talk upon
84
which no charge for misrepresentation can be based.

Over the years the puffery defense has been frequently relied
upon. However, the courts have ruled in many cases that the
85
The question is,
claim goes beyond puffery to real deception.
80. See generally Comment, Illusion or Deception: The Use of 'Prop' and
'Mock-ups' in Television Advertising, 72 YALE L. J. 145 (1963).
81. See Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 677.
82. Id.
83. 153 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1946).
84. Id. at 496.
85. See Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 53 F.T.C. 354, 375 (1958) ("milder" cirgarette is one that is less irritating; "soothing and relaxing" held categorical claim
for cigarettes, not puffing). FTC v. Sewell, 240 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd per
curiam, 353 U.S. 969 (1957) (claim that shoe insert improved "poise and balance"
and improved "foot action'. found not puffing).

then, what is "puffing?" 86 One answer is that the definition seems
to be changing with the passage of time. A claim that would have
been regarded as subjective opinion and legitimate puffery years
ago might now be viewed in a different light. Consumerism has
forced a new orientation which affects when a puffery defense will
be regarded as appropriate.
In FTC v. Tanners Shoe Co.,87 the Commission denied the puffery defense, noting that:
It was stipulated that it is not literally true that respondents' shoes will
"assure" comfort or a perfect fit to all individuals. However, respondents
contend that such representations constitute legitimate trade puffery and
are not false representations within the meaning of the law. . .. The representation that the product provides support where it is most needed
clearly carries an orthopedic or health connotation, and it is undisputed
that respondents' shoes are not orthepedic . . . but are stock shoes. It
would appear that such a representation is false in attributing to the product a quality which it does not possess rather than exaggerating a quality
which it has. 88

In In re Colgate-PalmoliveCo.,89 the respondent claimed that the
advertisement, involving the sandpaper shaving demonstration,
was merely fanciful exaggeration. The Commission's decision
noted that to term the demonstration puffery was "inconsistent
with the prevalent judicial and administrative policy of restricting, rather than expanding, so-called puffing." 90 This case gives
further evidence that the puffery defense is much less reliable today than it has been in the past. It should be noted that while the
number of exceptions to the puffery defense are few, the situation
can be compared to the forest which has lost a few trees: it still
exists. However, the time can come when the remaining trees no
longer constitute a forest.
86. R.B. Sherian in the play The Critic, Act I, described puffery in this manner.
Puff: . . . 'twas I first enriched their style-'twas I first taught them to
crowd their advertisements with panegyrical superlatives, each epithet
rising above the other. . . From me they learned to inlay their phraseology with variegated chips of exotic metaphor by me too their inventive
faculties were called forth: yes, sir, by me they were instructed to clothe
ideal walls with gratuitous fruits-to insinuate obsequious rivulets into visionary groves. . . This, sir, is. . . the art of puffing...
Comment, Developments in the Law--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1005, 1005 (1967).
87. 53 F.T.C. 1137 (1957).
88. Id. at 1142, 1144.
89. 59 F.T.C. 1452 (1961).
90. Id. at 1469. See also I. L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLow-UPs: PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING (1975). But see FTC v. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23,
64-65 (1972).
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C.

The Meaning of the Advertisement-Interpretive Authority of
the Commission

1. Evidence
Hard evidence is seldom employed to support or refute the interpretation of an advertisement upon which a charge of deception is based. Either it is not introduced at all or if it is
introduced, in the form of a dictionary definition, consumer or expert testimony, or survey research, it is simply not very persuasive. Generally, the Commission develops conclusions based
upon its own analysis of the advertisement, 9 1 and the judiciary
has been quite willing to uphold the Commission even when the
only available evidence contradicts the Commission's position.
One commentator stated:
The courts rationalize their frequent deference to the Commission's determination of meaning on the ground that meaning is a question of fact
within the sole authority of the Commission. Although on rare occasions
a court will reverse the Commission's determination of meaning if "arbitrary or clearly wrong" or not supported on the record as a whole by sub-

stantial evidence, more often the court will simply declare that the
Commission must be affirmed unless completely "unsupported" in the
because of "the
record or that meaning is a question not be be reviewed
' 92
Commission's special expertise and responsibility.

In the leading case of Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC,93 the Commission's unfettered discretion to determine the meaning of an advertisement was affirmed. The Commission found that an
advertisement giving the number of tubes in a Zenith radio was
deceptive since Zenith included in its count rectifier tubes. The
Commission held that the public would assume that a reference
to tubes would be those that detect, amplify, or receive radio signals. In answering Zenith's claim that consumer testimony regarding the meaning of the advertisement was required the court
declared:
The Commission was not required to sample public opinion to determine
91. See, e.g., Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. F'C, 518 F.2d 962, 963 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 385
(1965). See generally Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal
Trade Commission, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 559, 563-67 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn].
92. Millstein, supra note 9, at 470. Thus, the Commission has discretion to
weigh the validity of conflicting evidence, and its decision will not be overturned
so long as there is some evidence in the record in support of the Commission's
conclusion. See Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962).
93. 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).

what the petitioner was representing to the public. The Commission had
a right to look at the advertisements in question, consider the relevant evidence in the record that aid it in interpreting the advertisements, and
then decide for itself whether the practices engaged 9in4 by the petitioner
were unfair or deceptive, as charged in the complaint.
Savitch v. FTC,95

In
the Commission's judgment, unsupported by
evidence, was similarly affirmed by the court which yielded to the
Commission's special expertise and responsibility.
2.

The Nonuse of Consumer Surveys

It is clear that the interpretation of an advertisement can be a
source of a disagreement. A reasonable approach to this problem
would be to develop a scientifically conducted test or survey
which determines exactly what meaning consumers attach to an
advertisement. A consumer laboratory test or field survey could
determine what percentage of the respondents are misinterpreting the advertisement and even what impact the misinterpretation is having upon their purchasing behavior. Further, the
analysis of the advertisement interpretation among various segments, such as the primary targets of the advertising, or segments
which might be more susceptible to misinterpretation than
others, could aid those making judgments about the nature and
the extent of deception. However, despite this rationale, consumer tests and surveys are almost never employed in deceptive
advertising cases, and in the few cases in which they are utilized
they are rarely influential. 96 There are several reasons why such
apparently useful procedures are not used.
a.

The Authority of the Commission

The Commission has simply not been required by the judiciary
to develop consumer survey evidence to support its position. 97
Therefore, with limited resources at its disposal, it has not had
any incentive to develop this type of evidence. Further, the Commission only singles out a limited number of advertisements to
prosecute. Presumably, most of the violations they do prosecute
94. 143 F.2d at 31.
95. 218 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield,
Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. FTC
352 F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1965); E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 740 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957), supporting the proposition that courts have
deferred to the Commission's determination that a certain set of facts constitutes
a deceptive practice.
96. See, e.g., Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358 (lst Cir. 1962); Exposition
Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. deneid, 380 U.S. 917 (1962).
97. See note 94 supra,and accompanying text. See also Pitofsky, note 9 supra,
at 678.
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are relatively obvious and do not require testing. 98
b.

Protecting the Ignorant and the Credulous

Advertiser's have been remarkably unsuccessful at developing
survey evidence which has been helpful in refuting a Commission
finding. In fact, because the courts have demanded that the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous be protected, survey evidence has been used against the advertiser. In FTC v. Benrus
Watch C0.,99 a survey showed that eighty-six percent of potential
watch buyers would understand the meaning of a preticketing
system. The Commission, relying on the fact that fourteen per00
cent would be misled, used the evidence to prove deception.
Similarly, in Rhodes PharrnacalCo. v. FTC,101 a survey showed
that ninety-one percent of the three hundred sampled consumers
were not misled by an advertisement for Imdrin, a palliative for
arthritis or rheumatism. Again, the Commission relied upon the
survey as evidence that nine percent believed that the product
would provide a treatment and cure for arthritis and rheumatism.102 Thus, under current circumstances, the advertiser, unless
there was a belief that the survey would show zero deception, is
naturally reluctant to invest money to generate this type of evidence.
c.

The Limitations of a Survey

There are difficulities inherent in developing a survey. The population of the survey group must be adequately defined, a defensible sampling plan must be created, and objective standards to
test questions for bias and validity must be established. 03 Even
assuming such a survey is technically acceptable, an amount of
98. An average of fewer than five hundred investigations of deceptive practices were initiated in each year during the period of 1965-1969, with an average of
fewer than seventy complaints issued each year. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
AssOCIATION COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 19-20 (1969).
Many of these investigations and complaints involved relatively insignificant advertising themes.
99. 64 F.T.C. 1018, 1032 (1964), affid, 352 U.S. 313 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 939 (1966). See also notes 41-54 supra, and accompanying text.
100. 64 F.T.C. at 1045.
101. 49 F.T.C. 263 (1952), affd, 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
102. 49 F.T.C. at 283.

103. See generally LUCK, WALES & TAYLOR, MARKETING
1974) [hereinafter cited as LUCK, WALES &TAYLOR].

RESERACH

148 (4th ed.

uncertainty will remain if only because of the fact that a sample
is involved. The difficulties of determining the validity of specific
surveys naturally causes apprehension among laymen. Such apprehensions are particularly understandable when one observes
the quality of some of the surveys that have been introduced.
FTC v. Stephen Rug Mills,10'4 was one of the rare cases in which
the Commission did not attempt to use a consumer poll to support its position. A label on a rug in question contained the name
"New Bedford" as well as a conspicuous indication that the rug
was "Made in Belgium." The Commission chose an unspecified
number of people "at random" from the New York telephone directory and sent them a questionnaire. A key question asked that
if a hooked rug was named New Bedford, would they gain any impression of the country of origin? Of the thirty-eight responses,
twenty-two answered the name indicated domestic manufacture. 0 5 The Commission indicated that this response was proof
of deception and the "Made in Belgium" disclaimer was inadequate to remove the deception. 106 With surveys like this, it is little wonder that they have not been extensively relied upon.
d. Legal Inhibitors
There is a natural reluctance by the legal profession to agree to
a single, impartial, court-commissioned consumer survey in part
because the use of a survey research is somewhat inconsistent
with the traditional adversary system of justice wherein each side
submits arguments and evidence supporting its position. The
judge or jury then weighs the two positions and arrives at a decision. Survey research, in contrast, is a direct approach to obtain
an accurate picture of cognitions or attitudes. Ideally, the results
should be unknown in advance and should be highly influential.
To an attorney, however, agreeing to a carefully conceived and
conducted survey is probably like calling a prestigious witness
without knowing which side his testimony will support. Moreover,
as one commentator pointed out: "[A] full exploration of these
(perceptual) issues would complicate and delay enforcement proceedings."10 7
3.

Consumer Surveys-A Proposal

Professor Ernest Gellhorn has proposed that the Commission's
procedures be modified to encourage or require reliance upon in104.
105.
106.
107.

34 F.T.C. 958 (1942).
Id. at 966-67.
Id. at 969.
See Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 679.
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dependent consumer surveys in determining deception.1 08 The
Commission's procedures involve a hearing under the auspices of
an examiner. The outcome of the hearing may be reviewed by or
appealed to the full Commission. After the full Commission has
acted, the findings can be further appealed to the courts. The
Rules now require a prehearing conference to exchange witness
lists and documentary evidence.10 9 The intent is to simplify and
expedite the hearings themselves. Professor Gellhorn suggests
that the Rules also "require that when the question of consumer
understanding is at issue in a false advertising case, the examiner
may in his discretion, order that a survey be taken by an independent expert, with the costs being assessed against the losing party or shared by the Commission and respondent."' 10
Such an order would not accompany every situation in which
false advertising is charged. In some cases, the circumstances
may not warrant the cost of an expensive and time-consuming
survey. A previous case, if similar, may be relied upon, or the deception may be obvious. The hearing examiner would have to use
discretion in ordering surveys, restricting their use to cases in
which "the dispute regarding consumer understanding is not frivolous and where its resolution would be aided by development of
reliable survey evidence."'
The examiner, under Professor Gellhorn's proposal, would have
the power to guide those conducting the survey as to sample selection and questionnaire development. The examiner would, of
course, consult with the parties involved during the survey design
phase. Ideally, there would be agreement among all concerned
that a survey design would permit a valid inference as to the interpretation an advertisement is precipitating among its audience.
If agreement could not be reached, the survey may include sufficient scope so that each party, perhaps by analyzing a different
subset of the survey, would be satisfied that the deception could
be determined.
The potentially troublesome issue would be the selection of the
sample population. The sample could focus on those to whom the
108. See generally Gellhorn, supra note 91. See also Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legislative and Judicial Reform, 17 U.
KAN. L. REV. 625, 635-37 (1969).
109. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.41-.46 (1978). See also note 26 supra and accompanying
text.
110. See Gellhorn, supra note 91, at 568.
111. Id.

advertisement was directed, to whom it actually reached, or to
those who had an opportunity to be exposed to it. It could also be
restricted to those who were potential buyers or even to those
who actually bought the product. Another reasonable sampling
group would be those consumers who are the most likely to be
deceived because of their education, experience, or motivation.
One approach would be to obtain a large and broad sample so
that analysis could be made for separate subgroups. The appropriate type of sample would depend upon how the survey was to
be interpreted.
A crucial question relating to the viability of the Gellhorn proposal is the development of reasonable standards of deception. If
the Commission should insist upon a zero deception standard, the
use of surveys is probably doomed. Assuming a more realistic
posture is forthcoming, what extent of misinterpretation would be
the basis for a finding of deception? Clearly, it would be impossible to identify a standard that would hold for all cases. Just as
zero percent is unrealistic, so too would be an arbitrarily fixed
number. The extent of allowable misinterpretation will depend
upon the situation. If health or safety is involved, a close to zero
deception level might be appropriate at least among those whose
health or safety is potentially involved. However, if economic
harm is at issue, such as with a dance school advertisement
which makes extravagant claims, a higher level of misinterpretation such as ten to fifteen percent, might be tolerated. By contrast, cases which are unlikely to cause even insignificant
economic harm such as those involving the disclosure of a product's foreign origin or whether charcoal briquets are made with
wood or corncob base should undoubtedly depend on the advertiser. If several segments of the public are involved, different percentage levels may be appropriate. However, the appropriate
level for each situation will have to evolve through time as a series of specific decisions are obtained.
The above discussion has mentioned only consumer surveys.
The implication is that a rather large probability sample would be
involved with the use of extensive questionnaires. Market researchers select a test instrument to fit the problems-some decision contexts call for quick inexpensive copy tests, others for
more elaborate field surveys, and still others require full-scale
market tests. 11 2 Similarly, there is no reason in this context to restrict testing to a single standard technique of some fixed scope.
Where there is disagreement as to whether five percent or seventy percent of those surveyed will misinterpret an advertise112. See

LUCK, WALES

& TAYLOR, supra note 103, at 94-126.
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ment, a survey of twenty-five thousand people is not needed to
determine which figure is closer to the truth. An estimate within
a plus or minus 0.01 percent would simply not be needed, and a
crude copy test would suffice. Professor Gellhorn's proposal actually becomes even more attractive when the wide range of avail3
able copy tests and surveys are considered.11
D.

Remedies

The only formal procedure established by the Federal Trade
Commission Act for enforcing its prohibiton of "deceptive acts
and practices"11 4 is to obtain a cease and desist order." 5 In some
cases involving food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, the Commission does have the power to obtain injunctions to stop the use of
the advertising in question until the case is decided on its merits.116

However in most cases, the Commission has relied upon

the cease and disist order.
The cease and desist order has often been described as a command to "go and sin no more,"1 7 having little practical effect.
Due to procedural delays, it is not uncommon for several years to
elapse between the complaint and the issuance of the order. 1 8 In
113. Id. Note that this proposal is not a suggestion that it be demonstrated that
some consumer has in fact been deceived. Rather it is a suggestion that research
be undertaken to demonstrate how typical consumers interpret an advertisement.
114. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
115. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
116. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (Supp. III
1973). See also Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 692-93 n.28.
117. See Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 692.
118.

See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL

TRADE COMMISSION 28-31 (statistics concerning administrative delays at the Commission), Note, 'Corrective Advertising' Orders of the Federal Trade Commission,
85 HARV. L. REV. 477, 483 (1971) (delays of three to five years between complaint
and order are common).
While the Commission apparently cannot immediately obtain the efficiency necessary to adequately safeguard consumers from deceptive advertising, there are
signs of improvement. Currently, cease and desist orders do not become final, and
therefore effective until the appeals process is exhausted. See note 26 supra and
accompanying text. However, the United States House of Representatives recently passed legislation amending the Federal Trade Commission Act to provide
that a cease and desist order would become effective within sixty days, unless it
was stayed by either the Commission or the appeals court. H.R. 3816, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977). S. 1288 originally containing the Federal Trade Commission
amendments was added to S. 1533, a measure authorizing funds for the Commission and requiring recodification of its rules.
The United States Senate then passed the House bill after substituting for it the
language in S. 1533. However, since there existed differences between the bills

one extreme case, it took sixteen years for the Commission to get
the word "Liver" out of "Carter's Little Liver Pills." During the
delay the objectionable advertising can continue. The most
significant remedial innovation has been corrective advertising,
which directs an advertiser found guilty of disseminating a false
and misleading claim to inform consumers, usually through the
same advertising media originally used to disseminate the false
claim, of the facts with respect to the claim.
The imposition of corrective advertising as a sanction by the
Commission was first suggested in 1970 by a group of law students, who organized under the acronym SOUP119 (Students Opposing Unfair Trade Practices) to intervene in the Campbell Soup
Company case. 120 The Commission, in denying the motion to intervene, made the following pronouncement:
We have no doubt as to the Commission's power to require such affirmative disclosures when such disclosures are reasonably related to the deand are required in order to dissipate the effects of that
ception found
12 1
deception.

Thus, the Commission adopted the concept of the corrective advertising and has used it not only in numerous proposed or final
consent orders, 2 2 but also in initial decisions 123 and in rare final
passed by the House and Senate concerning a number of provisions, the bills were
submitted to a Conference Committee. Although the Conference report was accepted by the Senate, 124 CONG. REC. S. 2014 (Feb. 22, 1978), the report was rejected by the House and sent back to conference, 124 Cong. Rec. H. 1570 (Feb. 28,
1978). While the precise form of the final law is yet undetermined, it is manifest
that improvements are forthcomming.
119. See generally Cornfield, New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REV. 693 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cornfield]; Thain, Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases, 19
N.Y.L.F. 1 (1973); Note, Corrective Advertising-The News Response to Consumer
Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 415 (1972); Note, Corrective Advertising Ordersof the
Federal Trade Commission: No, Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Build Strong
Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH. L. REV. 374 (1971).
120. 77 F.T.C. 664 (1970).
121. Id. at 668.
122. A party who enters into a consent order agreement admits proposed Commission findings, waives the right to challenge the Commission order, and is legally bound to obey once the agreement is finally accepted by the Commission.
See 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1978). See generally Cornfield, supra note 119, at 696-97.
See also Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,210 (FTC 1977) (con21,339 (FTC 1977) (consent); Idea
sent); Zayre Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
Research & Dev., Inc. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $T
20,911, 21,197 (FTC 1976) (need for legal advice in dealing with patent promotion
firm); Nagle, Spillman & Bergman, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP (CCH) 1 21,157 (FTC 1976) (ad agency order concerning use of salt substitute); Revlon, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP (CCH) T 21,186
(FTC 1976) (health hazard resulting from use of hair straightener); Lustrasilk
Corp. of America, Inc. [1973-1976 Transfer Finder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,041
(FTC 1975) (health hazard of hair conditioner); Miriam Mascheck, Inc., [1973-1976
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,800 (FTC 1975) (wrinkle and blemish removal process); Beatrice Maggie Edwards, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
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orders.124 Litigation of the pertinent questions in the court has
only just started. 25 The first corrective advertising order to be reviewed and upheld by a federal appellate court was discussed in
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC.126 Concluding that the Commission
20,685 (FTC 1974) (medical treatment for removing
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
wrinkles and blemishes); Forever Young, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,649 (FTC 1974) (medical treatment, again, to remove facial
wrinkles and blemishes); Boise Tire Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 20,347 (FTC 1973) (comparative advertising involving tires); Amstar,
Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,356 (FTC 1973) (nutritional claims for sugar); Biochemic Research Foundation, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,463 (FTC 1973) (health effects of flake salt as
compared with commercially prepared salt); Coca-Cola Co., [1970-1973 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 7 12,351, (FTC 1970), and 19,605 (FTC 1971) (consent); ITT Continental Baking Co. and Ted Bates & Co., [1970-1973 Transfer
19,681 (FTC 1971) (consent); Standard Oil Co.,
Binder] TRADE REG. REG. CCH)
19,352 (FTC 1970) (con[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REG. (CCH)
sent).
123. Often initial decisions which incorporate corrective advertising provisions
fall when reviewed by the Commission or are at least substantially modified. The20,282,
odore Stephen Co. 1973-1976 transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,497, 20,693 (FTC 1974) (bait and switch carpet sales; Administrative Law Judge
imposed corrective advertising "in order to stop respondents and deter others.");
Wilbanks Carpet Specialists, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
20,381, 20,597, 20,739 (FTC 1974) (bait and switch carpet sales, initial or(CCH)
der required corrective advertising of scarlet letter type which Commissioner Nye
deleted because "the record in this case, however, does not support the requirements that respondents set forth any form of 'consumer warning'"); Tri-State Car20,497, 20,666,
pets, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,741, 20,742 (FTC 1974) (bait and switch carpet sales; Commission removed sua
sponte the corrective advertising requirement since there was "insufficient evidence that a consumer warning is necessary or appropriate means for the termination of the acts or practices complained of or for the prevention of their
recurrence.").
124. Peacock Buick, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
7 20,947, 21,083, 21,105 (FTC 1976) (misrepresentations concerning car sales); En20,805,
cyclopedia, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,119 (FTC 1976) (contests used as leads for salemen); Warner-Lambert Co.,
21,066 (FTC 1975) (Listerine
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
mouthwash).
125. See Warner-Lambert Co., supra note 124, where the respondent filed a petition for review in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Mis. Case,
Docket No. 76-0080 (1976). A tangential standing issue was decided in Consolidated Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In that case, efforts
by consumers to seek implementation of a corrective advertising order after the
Commission had rejected its use failed since only those directly affected by a
cease and desist order have standing to challenge the Commission's action in
court.
126. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), supp. op. on petitionfor rehearing, 562 F.2d
768 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1576 (1978) (it is interesting to note that
between January 1, 1971 and May 1977 eighty Commission orders were issued
which have so far resulted in the filing of thirteen petitions for certiorari.All thir-

could generally use remedies which went beyond the simple
cease and desist order, 127 the court then examined whether corrective advertising in particular exceeded the limits of the Commission's power. Based on its interpretation of the 1975
amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act and their legislative history,128 the inapplicability of first amendment rights to
129
reasonable regulation of false or misleading advertisements,
and the "well-established" nature of the corrective advertising
concept, 130 the majority of the court found the Commission's action in ordering corrective advertising under the circumstances of
this case warranted and within its power both legislatively and
teen petitions have been denied. H.R. REP. No. 339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 n.41
(1977).
For approximately one hundred years, Warner-Lambert Co. had advertised Listerine, one of its products, as being effective and beneficial in fighting colds, cold
symptoms and sore throats. The Commission issued a complaint against the company in 1972 charging that the company had misrepresented the effectiveness of
Listerine. An Administrative Law Judge upheld the allegations of the complaint
in his initial decision which was subsequently affirmed by the Commission and
then appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court.
127. 562 F.2d at 757.
128. Id. at 757-58. The court agreed that Commission authority to impose penalities other than a cease and desist order (e.g., civil penalties) was not granted in
the original Act of 1914, 39 Stat. 717 (1914), or the Wheeler-Lea amendments in
1938, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). Id. at 757. While the court found that this fact did not
prevent the use of the remedy, it devoted greater emphasis to amendments embodied in the Magnuson-Moss-Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (for an informative discussion of this Act see Comment,
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the Tables on Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL.
W. L. REV. 391 (1977)). Specifically, a new consumer redress provisions was added
to the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V 1975). This section empowered the Commission, following a final cease and desist order, to commence a civil action in federal
district court. If the court found the violator had acted in bad faith it could grant
relief including "rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or
return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification respecting
the. . . unfair or deceptive act..." 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975). (Emphasis
added). Basing its decision in part on congressional intent, the court held that the
grant to a court of the power of notification did not preclude Commission corrective orders. 562 F.2d at 757-58.
There is additional support for this holding with regard to intent. A report of the
Senate Commerce Committee in referring to this provision stated: "ItJhis section
would not affect whatever power the Commission may have under Section 5 of the
FTC Act to fashion relief in its initial cease and desist order, such as corrective
advertising or any other remedy, which may be appropriate to terminate effectively unfair or deceptive acts or practices." S. REP. No. 151, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
28 (1973). (Emphasis added.) See generally [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7702.
129. See note 188 infra, and accompanying text.
130. 562 F.2d at 759-61. The majority discussed the past use of orders analogous
to corrective advertising requirements where the Commission had tried to remove
residual effects of false advertising and concluded by uttering that: "[t]o allow
consumers to continue to buy the product on the strength of the impression built
up by prior advertising-an impression which is not known to be false-would be
unfair and deceptive." Id. at 761.
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131

constitutionally.
Although the use of corrective advertising has been supported
other
in one circuit, some uncertainty still exists. Nevertheless,
132
federal agencies have also begun to issue such orders.
Corrective advertising is premised conceptually on the notion
that advertising has a residual effect. 133 It is contended that false,
deceptive, or unfair claims made in prolonged advertising, are retained in the minds of the public for a considerable period of
1 35
Theretime, 134 even after the unlawful advertising has ceased.
131. In fact, the court appears to have adopted the following standard used by
the Commission in corrective advertising cases:
[I]f a deceptive advertisement has played a substantial role in creating or
reinforcing in the public's mind a false and material belief which lives on
after the false advertising ceases, there is a clear and continuing injury to
competition and to the consuming public as consumers continue to make
purchasing decisions based on the false belief. Since this injury cannot be
averted by merely requiring respondent to cease disseminating the advertisement, we may appropriately order respondent to take affirmative action designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the
advertisements. 562 F.2d at 762.
A question which was skirted was the permissible breadth of the Commission's

proposed corrective advertising order. It was not decided whether an advertiser
may be required to include words or phrases which not only bring attention to the
fact that his advertisement is meant to be corrective, but also humiliate him. See
562 F.2d at 763 n.69. Note also that Judge Robb's dissent is strongly opposed to basic tenets of the majority opinion, i.e., that corrective advertising is within the
Commission's power. See also Haas, Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC: The Possibilities
and Limitations on Corrective Advertising, 13 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 348 (1977)
(after reviewing the holding in Warner-Lambert,and analyzing the concept of corrective advertising, the comment contended that questions remain as to the Commission's statutory authority to impose the remedy. It is also urged that the
Commission may be severely restricted as to when orders may be imposed and
the nature of the disclosures that can be made). For a recent update on the
Warner-Lambert corrective advertising campaign see Listerine Slips in
Disclaimer,ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 11, 1978, at 2.
132. See Upjohn to Run Warning Ads for Two Drugs, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 3,
1975, at 59. (Food and Drug Administration consent order); Trans-World Airlines,
Inc., Enforcement Proceedings, CAB DOCK. No. 28970 (initial Dec., Nov. 24, 1976)
(premature fair cut ads).
133. The "residual effects" which emanate from advertising form the fundamental rationale behind the use of corrective advertising. See Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The FTC Response, 27 Bus. L. REV. 891, 894, 897 et seq. (1972)
(who calls it the "unfairnness doctrine"); Note, Corrective Advertising Orders of
the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REV. 477, 494 (1971). It has been
stated: "that advertisements seek to penetrate the memory of the consumer so
that at some time they will trigger or increase the likelihood of a purchase by that
consumer of the advertised products." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398,
431 (1972) (Comm. Jones, dissenting).

134. See Note, Corrective Advertising-The New Response to Consumer
Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 416 (1972) Note, Corrective Advertising Orders of

the Federal Trade Commission: No, Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Build Strong

fore, goes the argument, corrective statements are needed for a
period equal to the period of such residual effect.136 It is further
argued that violators prolong the period of deceptive advertising
by taking advantage of all possible procedural delays before the
Commission, so as to get the undeserved benefits from continuing
their violations during these proceedings and, during the period
37
in which the alleged residual effect is operative.'
In most instances, the practice and procedure of the Commission regarding corrective advertising takes the form of consent orders.138 Initial decisions by administrative law judges have
mentioned the availability of corrective advertising as an appropriate sanction under certain circumstances. 1 39 However, final
corrective advertising orders are unusual since most cases are
settled through the issuance of consent orders.140 It is obvious
that the Commission is not presently overly anxious to order corrective advertising without the consent of the advertiser.
Usually, the orders require that twenty-five percent of the advertising dollar be devoted to correction of residual effects.' 4 ' The
time span is customarily one year; but the Commission has begun
to leave the time span open, requiring a minimum time of a year
and continuation of the corrective advertising until certain stipulated results can be proved. 42 Initially advertisers had the choice
Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH. L. REV. 374, 380 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Corrective Advertising]; and many other authorities not herein cited.
Although advertisements may produce residual effects "there is today very little
research and virtually no empirical studies which can establish or demonstrate
the actual way in which information gleaned from an advertisment ... operates to
trigger in that consumer an intent to purchase the advertised product." Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 432 (1972) (Comm. Jones, dissenting). However,
for interesting discussions concerning the impact of advertising on consumer behavior, see generally supra note 38, and authorities cited therein.
135. The Commission rarely considers abandoned advertising as moot. See
New Response, supra note 134, at 419; Corrective Advertising, supra note 134, at
392.
136. There is, however, complete silence as to how to arrive at the appropriate
duration. See Corrective Advertising, supra note 134, at 398.
137. See Jones, To Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth ... 26 FOOD DRUG L. J. 174,
184 (1971).
138. Only in In the Matter of Warner-Lambert Co., supra note 124, was there an
"initial decision" by an Administrative Law Judge imposing corrective advertising.
139. See Firestone Tire &Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 471 (1972), affd, 481 F.2d 246
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Wasem's, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 209 (1974); Amstar Corp., 83 F.T.C. 649
(1973); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972); ITT Continential Baking Co., 79 F.T.C. 248 (1971). Only two orders deviate: Sugar Information, Inc., 81
F.T.C. 711 (1972), wherein a different road was taken and Medi-Hair, Int'l, 80 F.T.C.
627 (1972) where only fiteen percent was required.
142. See RJR Foods, Inc. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,334 (FTC 1973) (a provisional consent order fashioned by the court concerning
the beverage "Hawaiian Punch").
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of abandoning advertising for a year, rather than to advertise correctively.1 43 There is now a tendency not to afford advertisers
such a choice. 14 4 Some orders obligate the advertisers to state
specifically that they have been found to have advertised deceptively.14 5 The reasons behind this requirement are said to be that
the public should be made aware of tendencies of an advertiser to
violate the law. 146
It is manifest that the intent of corrective advertising is to
counteract past deception. If consumer misunderstanding can be
corrected, then the consumer presumably will be more likely to
obtain greater utility from purchase decisions and the competitive
47
balance will be restored.1
IV.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The power of the Commission to regulate advertising is not
without limits.14 8 Although it has not always been so held, advertising, despite its commercial nature, is nonetheless speech protected by the first amendment. 149 The doctrine that the
protections of the first amendment do not apply to commercial advertising was abruptly decided in 1942, in Valentine v.
0
Citing no authority and discussing no public polCrestensen.15
143. See cases cited in note 122 supra. See generally, Anderson & Winer, Corrective Advertising: The FTC's New Formulafor Effective Relief, 50 TEX. L. REV.
312, 330 (1972).
144. See New Response, supra note 134, at 431.
145. This practice is aptly referred to as a "scarlet letter" requirement. See

Standard Oil Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]

TRADE REG. REP.

(CCH)

19,352

(FTC 1970); Coca-Cola Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,351 (FTC 1970), 19,063 (FTC 1971); Austern, What is Unfair Advertising, 26 FoOD
DRUG CosM. L. J. 659, 662 (1971). But see Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue
Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 496, 519-24 (1972), which suggests that the use of confessional disclosures are beyond the Commission's statutory authority.
146. See CorrectiveAdvertising, supra note 134, at 374, 384-85.
147. For a recent Commission response to corrective advertising see generally
Comment, Corrective Advertising: Proposed Interpretive Rule of Policy Statement,
39,046 (FTC 1977).
4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
148. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 983 (1977) (the court found that when considering government restrictions
on speech "[t]he First Amendment requires . . . an examination of the Commission's action that is more searching than in other contexts." The court concluded
that in making its review the appropriate premise is that prior restraints are suspect and that the least restrictive means must be employed).
149. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
150. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Compare Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir.

icy, 15 1 the Court upheld a municipal sanitation ordinance invoked
to prohibit the distribution of a handbill with both a political and
a commercial message. The Court held that states were free to
regulate commercial advertising because it was not speech within
52
the meaning of the first amendment.
A.

Erosion of the Chrestensen Doctrine

For years, Chrestensen was followed unhesitatingly.1 5 3 Gradually, though, several of the justices indicated doubt about or disagreement with the holding in Chrestensen. Justice Frankfurter, in
a footnote to a concurring opinion,154 expressed an apparent
doubt as follows: "No useful purpose would be served by the
challenged regulation as though it imposed no real restraint on
55
The
speech or the press," referring, inter alia, to Chrestensen.1
Court intermittently returned to the Chrestensen doctrine, 56 but
three justices other than Justice Frankfurter expressed criticism
in more or less obvious ways. Justice Douglas gave vent to his
1941) (Commission may not constitutionally prohibit distribution of false and misleading phamphlets on aluminum cookware by person not materially interested in
cooking utensil trade) with Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693 (7th
Cir. 1951) (distribution of stainless steel utensils may be prohibited from false and
deceptive advertising disparaging aluminium cookware). See also FTC v. National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919
(1976); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
151. Justice Douglas, concurring in Cammarano v. United States 358 U.S. 498
(1959) articulated that "Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 56, held that business
advertisements and commercial matters did not enjoy the protection of the First
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. The ruling was
casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection." Id. at 513-14.
152. 316 U.S. at 54-55. The fact that advertising is a form of speech, a means of
communicating ideas or information or opinions, and literally within the first
amendment's protection of freedom of speech was totally ignored. For a quartercentury before Chrestensen and even longer thereafter, almost everyone accepted
as gospel that the first amendment was irrelevant to the Commission's regulation
of advertising. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 9, and Note, First Amendment
Protectionfor Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U.
CH. L. REV. 205 (1976).

153. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 111 (1943); cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412
(1950), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950); cf. Justice Reed's opinion for the
Court in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), rev'd upon rehearing, 319 U.S. 103
(1943), where he said that "commercial advertising cannot escape control by the
simple expedient of printing matter of public interest on the same sheet or handbill." Id. at 597.
154. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 842
(1951), further rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 936 (1958).
155. Id. at 529 n.7.
156. Talley v. California, 362 US. 60, 71 (1960) (Clark J. dissenting); cf. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966) (the Court disclaimed any involvement of a commercial factor in its
decision, id. at 474, yet it viewed the "publications against a background of commercial exploitation." Id. at 466).
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feelings in several separate opinions,157 and considerably later,
became more vociferous in an unusual, reasoned dissent to a denial for a petition for a writ of certiorari, saying:
I am unpersuaded by the notion that because the petitioner's publications
were commercial in nature they deserve less or no First Amendment protection. It is true that . . . Chrestensen . . . held that business advertisements and commercial matter fell outside sanctional expression, but as I
holding was ill-conceived and has not
suggested in Cammarano . . . that
158
weathered subsequent scrutiny.

In doing so, he relied on the fact that the Court had meanwhile
repeatedly ruled that profit enterprises are not deprived of full
first amendment status just because they operate for commercial
gain.15 9
In 1967, Justice Harlan seemed to indicate some misgiving
about Chrestensen when he enunciated, in his partly-concurring
and partly-dissenting opinion in Time, Inc., v. Hill:160 "[Tihe
question whether a state may apply more stringent limitations for
the use of the personality in 'purely commercial advertising' is
161
not before the court.'
More recently, Justice Brennan said in a footnote: "We also intimate no view on the extent of Constitutional protection, if any,
for purely commercial communications made in the course of
business."162 Then in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,163 Chief Justice Burger indicated disagreement with Chrestensen.16 4 Likewise, Justice Stewart
157. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
and in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15 (1959) (Douglas J., concurring).
158. Dun &Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-05 (1971) (Douglas J., dissenting).
159. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499 (1952); and New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
160. 285 U.S. 374 (1967).
161. Id. at 405.
162. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971).
163. 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (holding that first amendment protection was available
for "help-wanted" advertising separated into sex-designated columns since each
advertising merely proposed a commercial transaction and since the underlying
commercial transaction and since the underlying commerical activity-use of an
applicant's sex as criteria of employment-was illegal). Pittsburg Press Co. has
been widely discussed by commentators. See Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The FirstAmendment At a Discount, 41 BRooKLYN L. REV. 60 (1974) (arguing that the Pittsburg case showed a moving away from the rigidity of the
commercial speech doctrine); Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight to
Chrestensen?, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974) (asserting Chrestensen should be
overruled). See also notes 174-91 infra, and accompanying text.
164. The Chief Justice said in dissent that, "[Tihe holding represents, for me, a

strengthened his dissent. 165 Justice Powell, basing his opinion for
the majority in part on Chrestensen, did so obliquely, giving the
impression that there is no deep conviction behind his feelings
166
concerning Chrestensen.
Erosion of the Chrestensen doctrine continued in Bigelow v.
Virginia,167 where the Court struck down as unconstitutionally
applied, a state statute which made it illegal to encourage, by way
of publication, the procurement of an abortion. The Bigelow opinion is rifled with indications of a moderating view toward first
amendment protection of commercial advertising. As the Court
articulated:
The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper had
commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests did
not negate all First Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of
constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement involved sales
or "solicitations" . . . or because appellant was paid for printing it . . . or
because appellant's motive or the motive of the advertiser may have in[TIhe case (Chrestensen) obviously does not
volved financial gain ...
any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per
support
168
se.

Although disavowing any intent to define the extent of protection which commercial advertising enjoys, 169 the Court neverthless listed five types of advertisements that it would consider
unworthy of first amendment protection. 70 Justice Rehnquist's
dissent evidences concern that the majority opinion opens the
." Id. at 393 (citadisturbing enlargement of the 'commerical speech' doctrine ...
tions omitted). He went on to articulate that "[I]n any event, I believe the First
Amendment freedom of press includes the right of a newspaper to arrange the
content of its paper, whether it be news items, editorials, or advertising, as it sees
fit." Id. at 394-95.
165. 413 U.S. at 401 (Stewart, J. & Douglas, J., dissenting). "Whatever validity
the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own facts .... " quoting
Justice Douglas' statement in Cammarano v. United Stated, 358 U.S. 498, 514
(1959).
166. 413 U.S. at 384-86.
167. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (The "Virginia Weekly" had published an advertisement pointing out the legality and availability of abortions in the state of New
York. As manager of the paper, petitioner was tried and convicted pursuant to
Virginia statute. The conviction was struck down as an unconsitutional application of the statute, and the Court concluded that the state of Virginia did not have
a valid interest in regulating what its citizens heard and read about services in
New York). Id. at 827-28.
168. Id. at 818. See also Comment, The First Amendment and Commerical Advertising: Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 60 VA. L. REV. 154 (1974).
169. Id. at 825. Since the Court denied that the state of Virginia had any valid
interest in the conduct it sought to regulate (see text at note 167 supra), it was
able to avoid a more difficult issue: While Bigelow makes it clear that speech will
not be denied first amendment protection solely by reason of its commercial character, it did not confront the question of how the protection afforded advertising
would be applied to activities which the States have a legitimate interest in regulating.
170. Id. at 828. Advertisements that: were deceptive or fraudulent; related to an
illegal commodity or services; furthered criminal schemes; invaded the privacy of
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door too wide 7 1 and that commercial advertisers will use the
opinion to abuse the public. With this opinion the pendulum
finally swung toward protection of commercial advertisements, al172
beit in a limited fashion.
B.

Virginia PharmacyBoard and CommercialAdvertising

On May 24, 1976, the Court clarified and reiterated its position
on these issues and finally discarded the so-called "commercial
173
speech doctrine," first established in Valentine v. Chrestensen.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc.,174 the Court was confronted with a Virginia
statute which made any pharmacist who advertised drug prices
guilty of unprofessional conduct. Since the pharmacists were required to be licensed, a pharmacist who violated the statute by
advertising ran the risk of paying a civil monetary penalty to the
licensing authority or losing his license and, thereby, his livelihood. A consumer and two non-profit organizations challenged
the constitutionality of the advertising proscription under the first
amendment on the theory that users of drugs were entitled to receive price information through advertising and that pharmacists
who desire to provide such information should not be prohibited
from doing so.
Affirming the judgment of the district court in a seven-to-one
decision, the Court struck down the statute.175 After reviewing
the gradual erosion of the commercial speech doctrine and acknowledging that Bigelow176 had severely limited the doctrine in
other citizens; infringed somehow on the rights of others, or were messages thrust
upon a captive audience.
171. Id. at 835.
172. But see Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affid sub nom. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), which
cites Bigelow for the exact opposite proposition in a case where a state statute
which prohibited the display and advertisement of contraceptives was challenged
as overbroad. The court reiterated that purely commercial speech was not protected by the first amendment, but then proceeded to delcare the statute under
consideration unconstitutional since it prohibited advertising of a mixed public interest-commercial nature.
173. See supra note 150, and accompanying text.
174. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
175. 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
176. For a discussion of the Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy Board cases, see
Schneider, Prior Restraints and Restrictions on Advertising After Virginia Pharmacy Board: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REV. 64,
66-71 (1978); Comment, First Amendment Protectionfor Commercial Advertising:

the area of public interest advertisements, the majority enunciated that:
Here, in contrast (to Bigelow), the question whether there is a First
Amendment exception for "commercial speech" is squarely before us.
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political ... The "idea" he wishes to communicate is simply
this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at Y price." Our question,
is wholly outside the protection of
then, is whether this 1communication
77
the First Amendment.

The opinion went on to examine various rationales for continuing the doctrine. The fact that money is spent to prepare advertisements and to show them to the public and that the advertising
is undertaken for a profit motive 178 does not justify denial of first
amendment protection. The only possible justification would be
the content of the advertisement. Yet speech which deals with a
commercial subject or just reports a fact is protected:
Our question is whether speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction, ". . . is so removed from an "exposition of ideas,"...
and from " truth, science, mortality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
...
that it
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,'"
17 9
lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not.

Similarly, there is no basis for denial to be found in the interests
of the individual parties to an advertising transaction. The advertiser's economic interest in the commercial transaction which
might result from an advertisement does not disqualify him from
protection.180 The individual consumer's interest "in the free flow
of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener, by
1 81
far, then his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.'
Even society, in a macroeconomic sense, has an interest in the
free flow of commercial information. It is in the public interest in
a free enterprise system to see that resources are allocated properly. Informed decision-making in the commercial sector promotes that interest and also assists in determining where and
82
how regulation of the free enterprise system is necessary.1
The New ConstitutionalDoctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV., 205, 205-22 (1976). These Comments are indicative of the current trend among legal commentators to get away
from looking only at the commercial content or speech and, instead, to scrutinize
the public value of the speech for which first amendment protection is sought.
177. 425 U.S. 748, 760-61 (1976).
178. Id. at 761. None of the decisions following Chrestensen seem to have
dwelled on the profit motive as a reason for excluding commercial advertising
from the protection of the first amendment, although expressions like "purely
commercial" have been used. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 405 (1967).
179. 425 U.S. at 762.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 763.
182. Id. at 764. In essence, the state was taking away the consumer's ability to
choose among economic decisions (where to shop, what prescription to request,
and so on) by depriving him of the information needed to make these decisions
intelligently. Such pre-emption of individual decision making was deemed by the
Court to be objectionable in a free-market economy. But the Court did not use
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Nor was the Court impressed by the state's arguments that: advertisements would allegedly endanger the "professionalism" of
pharmacists by dragging them into detrimental commercial competition;183 that more adulterated drugs might be sold by remiss
pharmacists, thereby endangering the consumer's health;18 4 that
prices might not fall as the result of price competition, since the
expense of advertising would be passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices; 185 and that perhaps the stable, desirable
pharmacist-customer relationship would be lost.186
The Court felt that these arguments were counterbalanced by
the state's own rigid regulation of the conduct of pharmacists
within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the state's approach was
simply too paternalistic. It was predicated upon maintaining the
ignorance of its citizens. Consumers should be allowed to perceive and decide for themselves where their own best interests
lie.' 87

However, the Court did give a non-inclusive list of regulations
to which advertisements may be subjected: restrictions on the
time, place, and manner in which advertisements are run; prohibitions on advertisements advocating illegal transactions; and regulations applicable to false and misleading advertisements.188
neo-classical, laissez-faire economic thinking to restrict the state's ability to regulate advertising, only to show that it could not accomplish these ends by suppression of first amendment freedoms.
183. Id. at 766.
184. Id. at 767.
185. Id. at 767-68.
186. Id. at 768-69.
187. Id. at 770.
188. Id. at 771. The first significant decision to address this issue was WarnerLambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977), supp. op. on pet. for
rehearing, 562 F.2d 768, 768-71 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1576 (1978).
The court decided that corrective advertising was an appropriate and constitutional method of regulating false and misleading advertising. On rehearing, it expanded its discussion of this area, concluding that corrective advertisements did
not regulate truthful speech, but rather limited speech aimed at deceiving the
public. Although the danger of a chilling effect on protected speech through corrective advertising was acknowledged by the court, the possibility was discarded
as "more theoretical than real." Greater concern was expressed that an advertiser's "right to advertise" might be impinged upon by such orders. However, the
governmental interest in protecting citizens "against deception-with its attendent
waste and misallocation by consumers to benefit of wrongdoers" coupled with a
lingering doubt about the degree of first amendment protection which should be
afforded commercial speech caused the court to reject petitioner's First amendment challenge to the commission's action in this case. See also People v. Columbia Research Corp., 71 Cal. App. 3d 607, 614, 139 Cal. Rptr. 517, 521 (1977).

Additionally, the Court stated that it was not dealing with "the
special problems of the electronic broadcast media"18 9 in this decision or with the constitutionality of regulating advertisements
by physicians or lawyers, professions which provide services to
the consumer, as opposed to standardized products such as
drugs. 1 90

However, the Court did suggest that, because of the "commonsense differences" between commercial speech and other varieties, even commercial speech subject to first amendment
protections may nonetheless enjoy a "different protection" than
that normally accorded under the first amendment.'91
C. The Aftermath of Virginia Pharmacy Board
Further elucidation of the Court's position on these matters resulted from three cases decided in the term following Virginia
Pharmacy Board. In the first, Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,192 a township had passed an ordinance forbidding the erection of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on real estate
189. 425 U.S. at 773. The Court has observed a distinction between the press
and the electronic broadcast media. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FTC, 395 U.S. 367,
386 (1969). The unique characteristics of the electronic media are its pervasiveness and its limited availability due to high cost. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,
1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1968).
190. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
191. Id. at 771-72 n.24. See also text of note 15 supra. The Justices were obviously concerned that their decision might be misconstrued as giving commercial
speech the same degree of constitutional protection as, for instance, political or literary speech. The Court quickly aborted any foolish notion that it was repealing
the Federal Trade Commission Act and other laws prohibiting false and deceptive
advertising. At.this point in the opinion, the Court injected footnote 24, which begins with an incontestable proposition:
"There are commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction' . . . and other varieties ...
[A]ttributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker ... They may also make it
appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form,
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are
necessary to prevent its being deceptive.. . They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restriants."
Id. at 771-72 n.24. (Emphasis added).
This footnote clearly should not be regarded as a comprehensive delineation of
the scope of valid governmental regulation of advertising under the first amendment. But its importance is reflected in the evident care with which it was written. The Court plainly intended to define at least the general direction it would
follow in future cases. Some basic points were made manifest. The constitutional
principle that a prior restraint on speech "bears a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity" does not apply to a Commission's cease and desist order.
Moreover, in contrast to political speech, commercial speech, if false or misleading, loses its first amendment protection.
192. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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in order to slow down what it perceived as a flight of white home
owners from a racially integrated neighborhood.193 The Court
struck down the ordinance on the basis that it interfered with the
citizens right to receive information,194 and that it was not a valid
exercise of the township's police power since it dealt with restrictions on the content rather than the time, place, or manner of
speech. The Court also ruled that the township's interest in restricting this type of speech did not outweigh its citizens right to
receive information.195 As Justice Marshall articulated:
If the ordinance is to be sustained, it must be on the basis of the township's interest in regulating the content of the communication, and not on
any interest in regulating the form . . . [T]he record here demonstrates
that respondents failed to establish that this ordinance 19is6 needed to assure that Willingboro remains an integrated community.

The Court concluded with a caveat concerning the extent of pro7
tection to be extended to commercial speech.19
In the second case, Carey v. Population Service Internation193. The Court specifically distinguished Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary,
491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), which upheld Gary, Indiana's prohibitation of "For
Sale" signs on a record wich showed that whites were fleeing en masse. "We express no view as to whether Barrick Realty can survive Bigelow and Virginia
Pharmacy." 431 U.S. at 95 n.9.
194. The Court stated that:
"[Plersons desiring to sell their homes are just as interested in communicating that fact as are sellers of other goods and services. Similarly,
would-be-purchasers of realty are no less interested in receiving like information about available property than are purchasers of other commodities
in receiving like information about those commodities. And the societal
interest in 'the flow of commerical information,' is in no way lessened by
the fact that the subject of commercial information here is realty rather
than abortions or drugs."
Id. at 92.
195. Id. at 94.
196. Id.
197. The Court stated that:
"Beyond this, we reaffirm our statement in Virginia PharmacyBoard that
the "commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more thanpropose a commercial transaction,' . . . and other varieties . . . suggest
that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired" . . . Laws
dealing with false or misleading signs, and laws requiring such signs to
'appear in such a form, or include such additional information' . . . as [is]
necessary to prevent [their] being deceptive,' therefore, would raise very
different constitutional questions."
Id. at 98.
Caveats of this nature seem to have become de rigeur for the Court and will
probably remain so until the parameters of first amendment protection for commercial speech are more precisely and clearly defined.

al,198 the Court invalidated a total ban on the advertising of con-

traceptives. Noting that the case at bench raised no question left
open in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court found the ban lacking after applying the commercial speech balancing test. 199 Finally, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,200 the Court evaluated the
advertising of price and availability of routine legal services. In
Bates, two attorneys were disciplined by their state bar association under a rule prohibiting most forms of legal advertising after
running advertisements for their "legal clinic" in a local newspaper. The Court held that the disciplinary rule infringed the appellants' first amendments rights. Although rejecting a challenge to
the state disciplinary rule as repugnant to the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the Court held that price advertisements concerning routine
legal services are neither unprofessional 20 1 nor inherently misleading 202 and that advertising is an essential adjunct to a free
market ecomony which may serve to reduce the cost of legal services to the consumer. 203 Nevertheless, the first amendment overbreadth doctrine was found to be inapplicable to all commercial
advertising. 204 As a result, the Court went on to examine the spe198. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
199. In the Township of Willingboro, Carey and Bates, infra, the Court recognized, after applying a balancing test, that the public's interest in receiving the information sought to be conveyed substantially outweighed the state's interest in
suppressing such communication.
200. 433 U.S. 350 (1977), rehearingdenied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
201. 433 U.S. at 368-72.
202. Id. at 372-75.
203. Id. at 377-78.
204. Id. at 380-81. In most first amendment cases, if a rule or statute has been
shown to restrict or to have a "chilling effect" on speech due to the breadth of its
provisions, it will be declared unconsitutional even though it has not been applied
with that result in order to ensure that otherwise protected speech will not be
muted by the uncertain provisions of the rule or statute in question. The Court
concluded that commercial speech is unlikely to be adversely affected by such uncertainty, since it "is linked to commercial well-being."
It should be noted that an "overbreadth" challenge should not be confused with
one on grounds of "vagueness," though a challenger will often assert both grounds
of invalidity. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). An unconstitutionally vague statute, like an overbroad one, creates "chilling effect" risks to protected speech. But a statute can be
quite specific-i.e., not "vague"-and yet be overbroad. The vagueness challenge
rests ultimately on the procedural due process requirements of notice, though it is
a challenge with special bite in the first amendment area.
Note the emphasis on the distinction between "overbreath" and "vagueness" in
Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), a challenge to a ban on the distribution of
anonymous handbills. Justice Brennan noted that the attack was not on grounds
of vagueness, "that is, that it is a statute 'which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application," id. at 249, but rather an attack "that the statute although lacking neither clarity nor precision, is void for
'overbreadth,' that is, that it offends the constitutional principle that 'a government
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
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cifics of the legal advertisements in question, and, after determining they were not misleading, 205 decided that they were entitled
206
to first amendment protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the breadth of the Commission's area of responsibility,
judicial review in the past has played a suprisingly small role in
defining the law of deception and demarcating the extent to which
protection of consumers must give way to competing interests.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the definition of "deceptive advertising" is evolving rapidly, as are the programs and remedies
that are intended to protect consumers. The advertising decisionmaker needs to be informed of the constraints on his advertising
programs and the sense of public opinion they reflect. On the
other hand, it is also necessary to resist suggestions to make commercial advertisements that are safe, but say nothing. Such an
approach will not only generate ineffective advertising campaigns,
but is an inappropriate response to the pressures contributing to
these changes.
Concerning the first amendment implications of Virginia Pharmacy Board and its progeny, it is manifest that they will have a
pervasive effect on the advertiser. Not only will they invalidate by
implication many state statutes which currently prohibit advertising in various "standardized product" fields, but they also reopen
a panoply of questions which had previously been considered answered. Are corrective advertisements required by the Commission subject to challenge as prior restraints? 207 Are injunctions
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." Id. at 250 (Citations omitted).
205. 433 U.S. at 381-82.
206. At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court listed, as it has done in all recent cases in this area, certain types of commercial speech for which regulation
would or might be appropriate: advertisements concerning the quality of legal
service, in-person solicitation by lawyers; reasonable restrictions on the time,
place and manner of advertisements; and special problems concerning advertising
on the electronic media. Id. at 709.
207. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 9; Schneider, Prior Restraints and Restrictions On Advertising After Virginia PharmacyBoard: The Commercial Speech
Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REV. 64 (1978). See also Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955) (The legal situation
presented by a corrective advertising order appears to be very similar to one described by Professor Emerson as a type of prior restraint, that is, a situation
where publication is conditioned upon a condition precedent. Id. at 656. It seems
that such an order would violate the doctrine against prior restraint).

against advertisements of products and services subject to prior
restraints? 20 8 How will the various competing constitutional
rights be balanced now that this new area of first amendment protection has been created? 209 These are just some of the difficult
questions to which answers will have to be developed judicially
210
over time.

LARRY

T.

PLEISS

208. See generally Note, The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, 75 MICH. L. REV. 745 (1977); Note, FTC v. Simeon Management Corp.: The First Amendment and the Need for Preliminary Injunctions of
Commercial Speech, 1977 DUKE L. J. 489 (1977). See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. F, 542
F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1679 (1977), the Commission's remedy
"can go no further in imposing a prior restraint on protected speech than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the remedial objective of preventing the violation." Id. at 619. Where the Commission's order prohibiting a loan company's use
of the slogan "Instant Tax Refund" in advertising exceeded its remedial authority
because the first amendment requires a "more searching" examination of its orders. (This decision has recently been criticized, not because of its recognition of
the first amendment rights, but rather, because the Court trespassed upon the
Commission's judgement in setting out what it believed to be adequate qualifing
language. See Reich, Consumer Protectionand the First Amendment: A Dilemma
for the FTC?, 61 MINN. L. REV. 705, 740 (1977).) See also, e.g. Blout v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Monaghan, First Amendment
"Due Process",83 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1970). Outside the commercial context the
use of injunctions or schemes requiring regulation, approval of speech would constitute a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint. See, e.g., Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 687 (1931). It has been suggested that the
rationale for excepting commercial speech from the prohibition against prior restraints is the exceptionally low value of commercial advertising. See The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 55, 158-60 (1973). The resistence of this type of
speech to the chilling effect of governmental regulation however, is an equally relevant factor.
209. Courts have begun to struggle with fine distinctions in these cases and
seem to resolve their difficulties by using a balancing test. In Pittsburg Press Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 276 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1977), the court differentiated between a speech
restriction which was ancillary to a specific prohibition or restriction of an activity
and direct regulation of that activity. Similarly, in Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co. 338
So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1591 (1977) (Statute prohibiting finance
company from communicating with a debtor's employer prior to obtaining final
judgment on the debt was found unconstitutional.) The Court looked at whether
the speech in question pertained to constitutional interests. It then decided to balance the individuals interest against the state's interest in determining whether
the public would be served by protecting the speech involved. See also Schneider,
Prior Restriants and Restrictions on Advertising After Virginia Pharmacy Board:
The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REV. 64, 74-83 (1978)
(the comment develops a two-step process for analyzing commercial speech ...
that is, weighing the interests involved and measuring the product of that balancing process against the degree of abridgment exerted by the regulatory device
brought to bear on commercial speech).
210. Now that it has been decided that commercial speech is covered by the
first amendment, consideration of the limits of its application, the inevitable "balancing," can proceed in a sensible manner, a process in which the studies by economists of the effects of advertising may be expected to play a useful role.
However, on a broader perspective, it is unlikely that either Virginia Pharmacy
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Board or its progeny will appreciably circumscribe the Commission's regulation
of advertising. See Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. REV. 661, 672 (1977). But see Reich, Consumer Protection and the First Amendment. A Dilemma for the FTC?, 61 MINN. L. REV. 705
(1977). It is dangerous to predict constitutional adjudication, especially where, as
here, courts have just set sail on an uncharted sea. However, while there may be
no immediate or dramatic changes, the law of advertising regulation will inevitably be affected by the introduction of the first amendment as a relevant and important factor.

